# Freshyo E2E — failed test cases (detailed) Companion to `docs/e2e-sanity-test-plan.md` (the plan) and `docs/test reports/e2e-sanity-test-results-2026-10-10-1310.md` (all results). This file expands **only the FAIL cases** with reproduction steps, evidence, root cause, and a suggested fix. All evidence was produced on 2026-10-10 against the local stack: backend `http://localhost:8787` (`/api/trpc`), disposable local D1, iOS simulator `com.freshyotrial.app` / `in.freshyo.adminui`, Chromium superadmin `http://localhost:4175`. Legend: **Severity** — Critical / High / Medium / Low. **Case IDs** match the plan. --- ## FC-01 — SEC-01: customer token can mutate global configuration - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `admin.const.*` now requires a staff token (`staffProcedure`); `updateConstants` additionally rejects global-scope keys (globals are superadmin-only); the redundant `getGlobalConstants`/`updateGlobalConstants`/`getLegacyConstants`/`updateLegacyConstants` procedures were removed (no production UI caller). Regression test: `apps/backend/tests/api/authorization-matrix.test.ts` (staff-guarded block). - **Severity:** Critical - **Case:** SEC-01 - **Symptom:** A signed-in *customer* can call the staff/admin global-config mutation and change app-wide constants. - **Steps to reproduce:** 1. `user.auth.login {identifier:"e2e_u2@test.com", password:"Pass@12345"}` → customer token. 2. `admin.const.updateGlobalConstants {constants:[{key:"versionNum",value:"1.2.0"}]}` with that token. - **Expected:** Rejected (staff-only). - **Actual:** `200 {success:true, updatedCount:1}`. - **Evidence:** Response body from step 2; anonymous `admin.product.getProducts` → 401, customer `admin.product.getProducts` → 500 (`Cannot read properties of null (reading 'regionId')`). - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/admin-apis/apis/const.ts` — `updateGlobalConstants` uses `protectedProcedure` (allows any authenticated user **or** staff) and never touches `ctx.staffUser`. `protectedProcedure` is defined in `apps/backend/src/trpc/trpc-index.ts`. - **Suggested fix:** Change the global-config procedures (`getGlobalConstants`, `updateGlobalConstants`, legacy ones) to `superadminProcedure` (global scope) or at minimum `staffProcedure`; remove the legacy admin global mutation or gate it behind superadmin. --- ## FC-02 — SEC-04: order accepts a SKU from another region - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `placeOrderUtil` now rejects an item whose product `regionId` ≠ the order region (409 "… is not available in this region"). - **Severity:** High - **Case:** SEC-04 - **Symptom:** A region-1 order can include a region-2 SKU. - **Steps to reproduce:** 1. U2 with a region-1 address (877). 2. `user.order.placeOrder {regionId:1, addressId:877, paymentMethod:"cod", selectedItems:[{skuId:157 /* region-2 product */, quantity:1, slotId:2012}]}`. - **Expected:** Rejected (SKU not in the ordering region). - **Actual:** `200`, order 2456 created with `regionId:1` and sku 157, priced at region-2's ₹149 + ₹20 delivery. - **Evidence:** Order 2456 in `orders`/`order_items`. - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/order.ts` → `placeOrderUtil` resolves items via `getOrderProductById(item.skuId)` with no region filter. Address region is checked, but SKU/slot/bound region coherence is not. - **Suggested fix:** Validate each SKU's `regionId` (and its product's region) equals the order region; reject otherwise. --- ## FC-03 — SEC-05: order accepts unassigned / out-of-stock / closed-slot items - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `placeOrderUtil` now rejects `isDeleted`/`isOutOfStock`/`isSuspended` items (400), requires a non-null slotId for scheduled orders, and validates each slot: exists, region match (409), `isActive`, `freezeTime`/`deliveryTime` in the future, and every ordered `skuId` present in `slot.skuIds` (400). - **Severity:** High - **Case:** SEC-05 - **Symptom:** The backend accepts items it should reject. - **Steps to reproduce:** - (a) Unassigned SKU: `placeOrder {regionId:1, selectedItems:[{skuId:1, quantity:1, slotId:2012}]}` where sku 1 is **not** in slot 2012 → **200**, order 2457. - (b) Out-of-stock: `admin.product.toggleOutOfStock{id:155}` → `placeOrder {skuId:155, slotId:2012}` → **200**, order 2458 (stock restored afterward). - **Expected:** Both rejected. - **Actual:** Both create orders. - **Evidence:** Orders 2457, 2458; schema still rejects non-positive/non-integer quantity. - **Root cause:** `placeOrderUtil` (order.ts) never checks `isOutOfStock` / `isSuspended` / `isDeleted`, nor that the SKU is a member of the selected slot, nor slot active/frozen state (only capacity is checked). - **Suggested fix:** In `placeOrderUtil`, for each item assert: SKU exists, belongs to region, not OOS/suspended/deleted, is assigned to the chosen slot, and the slot is active and not frozen. --- ## FC-04 — SEC-06: user-based coupon is not restricted to its user - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `validateAndGetCoupon` now loads `applicableUsers` and rejects a user-based coupon for anyone not listed (unless `isApplyForAll`): `This coupon is not applicable to your account`. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** SEC-06 - **Symptom:** A coupon created for U1 can be applied by U2. - **Steps to reproduce:** 1. Admin: `coupon.create {couponCode:"E2EU1ONLY", discountPercent:10, isUserBased:true, applicableUsers:[388], maxLimitForUser:3}`. 2. U2: `placeOrder {…, couponId:46}`. - **Expected:** Rejected (coupon is for user 388 only). - **Actual:** `200`, order 2463 discounted. - **Evidence:** Order 2463; coupon 46 has `isUserBased:true`. - **Root cause:** `packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/user-apis/coupon.ts` → `validateAndGetUserCoupon` does not consult `applicableUsers`. (Expiry **is** enforced.) - **Suggested fix:** Reject when `coupon.isUserBased && !applicableUsers.includes(userId)`. --- ## FC-05 — SEC-07: public vendor packaging mutation + expired-snippet leak - **Severity:** High - **Case:** SEC-07 - **Symptom:** Anyone can toggle order-item packaging; expired snippets still list orders. - **Steps to reproduce:** 1. Admin creates a vendor snippet for slot 2012 (`E2ESNIP`). 2. Anonymous `admin.vendorSnippets.updateOrderItemPackaging {orderItemId:8237, is_packaged:true}` → **200** (toggled U1's order item). 3. Admin creates an **expired** snippet (`validTill:"2020-01-01"`); anonymous `admin.vendorSnippets.getOrdersBySnippetAndSlot {snippetCode:"E2ESNIPEXP", slotId:2012}` → **200** with customer names + orders. - **Expected:** Packaging edits require vendor authority; expired snippets return nothing. - **Actual:** Anonymous mutation succeeds; expired snippet leaks orders. - **Evidence:** Both responses above (item 8237 toggled true→false). - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/admin-apis/apis/vendor-snippets.ts` — `updateOrderItemPackaging` is `publicProcedure` with the auth check commented out; `getOrdersBySnippetAndSlot` never checks `validTill` (unlike `getOrdersBySnippet`). - **Suggested fix:** Require a valid `snippetCode` (unexpired) and authorize the mutation against the order's slot/snippet; enforce expiry in the slot-variant query too. --- ## FC-06 — BL-02: `minRegularOrderValue` is not a real minimum - **Status:** ✅ **Resolved** (2026-10-10) — the constant was removed. It was never a hard minimum (nothing enforced it) and is no longer used as the delivery threshold, so it was dead. Removed from both const registries, the essential-consts payload, the web-ui hook, the admin/superadmin bound editors, the seeds, and the tests. No minimum-order rule is enforced (matching the customer app). - **Severity:** Medium - **Case:** BL-02 - **Symptom:** Orders below the configured minimum are accepted. - **Steps to reproduce:** `placeOrder` with subtotal ₹199 while bound A1 `minRegularOrderValue:300`. - **Expected:** Blocked if it is a hard minimum (policy needs confirmation). - **Actual:** `200` (orders 2457/2458). - **Evidence:** Orders below 300 accepted. - **Root cause:** `placeOrderUtil` uses `minRegularOrderValue` only as the free-delivery threshold, never as a minimum-order gate; the client uses `freeDeliveryThreshold` instead. - **Suggested fix:** Decide the contract (minimum vs informational). If a minimum, enforce it in `placeOrder` and surface it in the cart; if not, rename/document it and stop using it as the fee threshold. --- ## FC-07 — BL-03 / BL-06: client and backend delivery-fee formulas diverge - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — the backend now uses the customer app's model: threshold key `freeDeliveryThreshold` (not `minRegularOrderValue`) and the post-discount basis (`finalTotal = subtotal − discount; delivery = finalTotal < threshold ? charge : 0`). - **Severity:** High - **Cases:** BL-03, BL-06 - **Symptom:** The amount the customer sees differs from what the backend saves. - **Steps to reproduce:** - BL-06 (different keys): bound A2 `min=300, free=800, charge=200`; subtotal ₹548. Backend order 2459 → `totalAmount:548, deliveryCharge:0`; client preview → `548<800` → ₹200 delivery → ₹748. - BL-03 (different discount basis): bound A1 `threshold 300`; subtotal ₹349, flat ₹100 coupon. Backend order 2461 → `totalAmount:249, deliveryCharge:0`; client preview → post-coupon 249<300 → ₹20 → ₹269. - **Expected:** Identical rule in cart, checkout, persisted order, and admin. - **Actual:** ₹200 / ₹20 discrepancies. - **Evidence:** Orders 2459, 2461. - **Root cause:** `apps/user-ui/components/cart-page.tsx` uses `deliveryCharge = (subtotal − discount) < freeDeliveryThreshold ? charge : 0`. `placeOrderUtil` (order.ts) uses `expectedDeliveryCharge = subtotal(pre-discount) < minRegularOrderValue ? charge : 0`. Different key **and** different discount basis. - **Suggested fix:** One shared pricing function (server-authoritative). Use the same threshold key and the same pre/post-discount basis on both sides; ideally the client renders the server quote. --- ## FC-08 — D10: percentage discount is applied to subtotal + delivery fee - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — the coupon discount is now computed on the cart subtotal only; delivery is decided afterwards and added on top (no longer discounted). - **Severity:** High - **Case:** BL-05 (and visible in SEC-06 order 2463) - **Symptom:** A % coupon discounts the delivery fee too. - **Steps to reproduce:** subtotal ₹199 + delivery ₹20, 10% coupon → order 2463 `totalAmount:197.1`. - **Expected:** Discount on the item subtotal only → ₹199×0.9 + ₹20 = ₹199.1. - **Actual:** (199+20)×0.9 = ₹197.1. - **Evidence:** Order 2463; also 15% case 2480 (₹186.15 = 219×0.85). - **Root cause:** `placeOrderUtil` passes `subOrderTotalWithDelivery` into `applyDiscountToUserOrder` for the first suborder. - **Suggested fix:** Apply the coupon to the item subtotal, then add delivery; keep the same order on the client. --- ## FC-09 — CP-05: SKU-restricted coupon is not enforced - **Status:** ⚪ **Not a defect for now** (2026-10-10) — SKU-specific coupons are not created today; coupons are intended to apply to all SKUs. `skuIds` is deliberately left unenforced. (Revisit if SKU-scoped coupons are ever introduced.) - **Severity:** High - **Case:** CP-05 - **Symptom:** A coupon limited to sku 155 discounts a cart containing only sku 156. - **Steps to reproduce:** `coupon.create {couponCode:"E2ESKU155", discountPercent:10, skuIds:[155]}` → `placeOrder` with only sku 156 → **200**, order 2474 (10% off 349). - **Expected:** Rejected. - **Actual:** Applied. - **Evidence:** Order 2474. - **Root cause:** `validateAndGetUserCoupon` does not enforce `skuIds` / applicable products. - **Suggested fix:** Validate cart items against the coupon's product/SKU scope server-side. --- ## FC-10 — CP-11: coupons are not region-scoped - **Status:** ⚪ **Not a defect for now** (2026-10-10) — region-scoped coupons are not wanted; coupons are global. No region filter is added. (Revisit if regional coupons are ever required.) - **Severity:** High - **Case:** CP-11 - **Symptom:** A region-1 coupon discounts a region-2 order. - **Steps to reproduce:** U2 region-2 address (883) + region-2 sku 157 + region-1 coupon 45 → **200**, order 2477 total ₹79. - **Expected:** Per region policy (reject if region-scoped). - **Actual:** Applied. - **Evidence:** Order 2477. - **Root cause:** coupon storage/validation (`coupons`, `validateAndGetUserCoupon`, user coupon fetches) carries no region filter. - **Suggested fix:** Decide global-vs-regional coupon policy; if regional, store `region_id` and filter both retrieval and validation. --- ## FC-11 — PD-13: deleting a store orphans its products - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `deleteStore` now counts the store's products and refuses to delete while any exist (plain error: "Cannot delete a store that still has products…"); the `store_id → NULL` step was removed, so products can no longer be orphaned. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** PD-13 - **Symptom:** `deleteStore` succeeds even when the store has products. - **Steps to reproduce:** `admin.store.deleteStore {storeId:1}` (store 1 had 41 products) → **200 "Store deleted successfully"**. - **Expected:** Blocked (or products reassigned). - **Actual:** 41 products left with `store_id = NULL`. - **Evidence:** DB count of `product_info where store_id is null` jumped to 41 (restored manually). - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/admin-apis/apis/store.ts` `deleteStore` and `packages/db_helper_sqlite` `deleteStoreFromDb` have no dependency guard/reassignment. - **Suggested fix:** Reject deletion when products reference the store, or require an explicit reassignment target; never leave products with a null store. --- ## FC-12 — DS-02: deleting a product tag fails (FK) - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `deleteProductTag` now deletes the `product_tags` junction rows first (in a transaction) before the tag row, so a tag with products deletes cleanly. No FK-cascade migration needed. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** DS-02 - **Symptom:** Tag delete throws a raw DB error when the tag has products. - **Steps to reproduce:** create tag 12 with products 155/156 → `admin.product.deleteProductTag {id:12}`. - **Expected:** Tag + junction rows removed. - **Actual:** `500` `Failed query: delete from "product_tag_info" …`. - **Evidence:** `product_tags` still had row (product 155 → tag 12); FK `ON DELETE no action`. - **Root cause:** `deleteProductTagInDb` deletes `product_tag_info` without first deleting `product_tags` junction rows. - **Suggested fix:** Delete junction rows (or use `ON DELETE CASCADE`) before the tag row. --- ## FC-13 — SL-04: closed (frozen) slot is accepted by `placeOrder` - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — the slot validation added for FC-03 rejects a slot whose `freezeTime` (or `deliveryTime`) has passed (400). - **Severity:** High - **Case:** SL-04 - **Symptom:** An order can be placed into a slot whose freeze time has passed. - **Steps to reproduce:** create slot 2015 with `freezeTime:"2020-01-01"` → `placeOrder {skuId:155, slotId:2015}` → **200**, order 2469. - **Expected:** Rejected (orders closed). - **Actual:** Accepted. - **Evidence:** Order 2469. - **Root cause:** `placeOrder` checks capacity (`getUserSlotCapacityStatus`) but not slot active/freeze state; the client only filters slots. - **Suggested fix:** Server-side reject when `slot.freezeTime <= now` or `!slot.isActive`. --- ## FC-14 — CT-07: cart does not reflect an out-of-stock item - **Status:** ⚪ **Not a defect (false flag)** (2026-10-10) — reproduced and disproven. The cart **does** implement the CT-07 behavior: `cart-page.tsx` renders an "Out of Stock" badge (`:962`), filters OOS lines out of the checkout payload (`:1247`), and blocks checkout with "Items Unavailable" when every line is OOS (`:1264`). The E2E only observed the pre-propagation window: after `toggleOutOfStock` the app keeps the previous `availability_version_num` until its `essentialConsts` `refetchInterval` (60 s) fires, so the cart shows the line normally for up to ~1 minute, then correctly shows "Out of Stock". The report's stated root cause (`cart-page` ignores `isOutOfStock`) was inaccurate. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** CT-07 - **Repro (2026-10-10):** cart held sku 155 ("E2E Chicken 500 g", qty 6, ₹1194); `toggleOutOfStock{id:155}` bumped availability `av-17 → av-18` (published `av-18` shows `isOutOfStock:true`); `stopApp` → `launchApp` → open cart → line normal; ~70 s later (the refetch interval) → red "Out of Stock" badge. Stock restored afterwards. - **Evidence (original E2E):** Published `availability.json` for region 1 `av-15` showed sku 155 `isOutOfStock:true`; the cart screenshot was taken inside the staleness window. - **Residual (out of scope, by decision):** the ~60 s propagation delay is cache-refresh latency, not a cart-logic bug. --- ## FC-15 — AU-07: profile update is broken (`ctx.req.header`) - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `Context.req` is now typed as the fetch `Request` the adapter passes, and `updateProfile` reads `ctx.req.headers.get('authorization')`. The optional email was relaxed too: an empty email means "no change", and the client only requires it when registering. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** AU-07 - **Symptom:** `updateProfile` always errors. - **Steps to reproduce:** `user.auth.updateProfile {name:"E2E U2 Renamed", bio:"hello bio"}` with a valid token. - **Expected:** Profile updated. - **Actual:** `500 "ctx.req.header is not a function"`. - **Evidence:** Response above; UI Edit Profile also blocked earlier by a required-email validation. - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/auth.ts` line ~342 calls `ctx.req.header('authorization')`, but `ctx.req` is a fetch `Request` (only `.headers.get`). - **Suggested fix:** Read the header via `ctx.req.headers.get('authorization')` (or drop the token echo). Relax the client's email requirement if email is optional. --- ## FC-16 — AU-08: password change has no effect (duplicate creds row) - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `upsertUserPassword` now selects then updates-or-inserts (updating all rows for the user, repairing existing duplicates), and a `uniqueIndex` on `user_creds.user_id` was added to the schema. Existing duplicate rows (users 379, 908, 1311) must be deduped before the index migration is applied. - **Severity:** High - **Case:** AU-08 - **Symptom:** After `updatePassword`, the old password still works and the new one fails. - **Steps to reproduce:** fresh user U5 → `user.auth.updatePassword {password:"NewPass@456"}` → login with old (works) / new (fails). - **Expected:** New password works, old fails. - **Actual:** Old logs in (200), new fails (500). - **Evidence:** `user_creds` for the user contains **two rows** (ids 26, 27) after the change. - **Root cause:** `upsertUserAuthPasswordInDb` inserts a new row instead of updating the existing one; login reads the stale row. - **Suggested fix:** Update the existing `user_creds` row (unique on `user_id`) rather than inserting; add a unique constraint if missing. --- ## FC-17 — OR-12: no order idempotency (duplicate submits) - **Status:** 🟡 **Mitigated client-side** (2026-10-10) — the Place Order button is disabled while a submit is in flight, and `handlePlaceOrder` early-returns via a synchronous `useRef` guard (plus `isPending`), so an accidental double-tap cannot submit twice. **Server-side idempotency was intentionally deferred**: `placeOrder` still has no idempotency key, so a direct API replay or network retry can still create duplicates. - **Severity:** Medium - **Case:** OR-12 - **Symptom:** Retrying/submitting twice creates duplicate orders. - **Steps to reproduce:** call the same `placeOrder` twice with identical params. - **Expected:** One order group (idempotent) or a clear dedupe. - **Actual:** Two calls created 4 orders (2465–2468). - **Evidence:** Order ids above. - **Root cause:** `placeOrder` has no idempotency key; only the client has a loading lock. - **Suggested fix:** Accept a client-generated idempotency key and short-circuit duplicate submissions. --- ## FC-18 — AD-06: address region/bound coherence not validated - **Severity:** Medium - **Case:** AD-06 - **Symptom:** An address can reference a bound from a different region. - **Steps to reproduce:** `user.address.createAddress {regionId:2, boundId:1}` (bound 1 is region 1's) → **200**, address 882 stored region 2 / bound 1. - **Expected:** Rejected (bound must belong to the region). - **Actual:** Accepted. - **Evidence:** Address 882. - **Root cause:** `apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/address.ts` create/update do not check that `boundId` belongs to `regionId`. Compounding this, `AddressForm` submits the current **browsing** bound, so the client can send an incoherent pair. - **Suggested fix:** Validate `bound.regionId === regionId` server-side; have `AddressForm` derive the bound from the chosen address region, not the browsing region. --- ## FC-19 — RG-02: region creation is not atomic on D1 - **Status:** ✅ **Fixed** (2026-10-10) — `createRegionWithBounds` now validates the bounds before touching the DB (≥1 bound, unique priorities) so a bad payload never reaches the inserts, and wraps the post-region inserts in a try/catch that deletes the region + its child rows if anything fails. Reproduced (leftover region 5), then re-verified: the duplicate-priority create now leaves **no** region behind. - **Severity:** Medium - **Case:** RG-02 - **Symptom:** A failed region create leaves a half-created region. - **Steps to reproduce:** `superadmin.regions.create` with two bounds at priority `1`. - **Expected:** Error, no region persisted. - **Actual:** `500 "Each bound priority must be unique…"` **and** region `E2E-DupPriority` exists with 0 bounds / 0 consts. - **Evidence:** Region row 4 with no bounds (removed manually). - **Root cause:** `packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/superadmin-apis/regions.ts` `createRegionWithBounds` wraps inserts in `db.transaction`, but on D1 the region insert is not rolled back when the bound insert violates the unique priority index. - **Suggested fix:** Validate bounds (unique priorities, valid geometry) before inserting, or use an atomic D1 batch that fails as a unit. --- ## FC-20 — AU-03 (and D8): error statuses flattened to HTTP 500 - **Severity:** Low - **Case:** AU-03 (same class as the cross-region `getProductById` 500) - **Symptom:** Auth/validation/not-found failures return 500 instead of 4xx. - **Steps to reproduce:** `user.auth.login` with a wrong password → `500`; unknown user → `500`; `admin.product.getProductById` cross-region → `500 "Product not found"`. - **Expected:** 401 / 404 respectively. - **Actual:** 500. - **Evidence:** Response statuses above. - **Root cause:** `ApiError` carries an HTTP status but `apps/backend/src/app.ts` `onError` / the tRPC error mapping only maps `TRPCError` codes, so `ApiError` falls through to 500. - **Suggested fix:** Translate `ApiError` (and thrown `Error` with a status) to the matching HTTP status in the global error handler / tRPC error formatter. --- ## Summary | Ref | Case | Severity | One-line | |---|---|---|---| | FC-01 | SEC-01 | Critical | Customer token mutates global consts — ✅ fixed | | FC-02 | SEC-04 | High | Cross-region SKU accepted — ✅ fixed | | FC-03 | SEC-05 | High | Unassigned / OOS / closed-slot items accepted — ✅ fixed | | FC-04 | SEC-06 | High | User-based coupon used by another user — ✅ fixed | | FC-05 | SEC-07 | High | Public packaging mutation + expired-snippet leak | | FC-06 | BL-02 | Medium | Minimum order not enforced — ✅ resolved (constant removed) | | FC-07 | BL-03/06 | High | Client vs backend delivery-fee divergence — ✅ fixed | | FC-08 | BL-05 | High | % coupon discounts the delivery fee — ✅ fixed | | FC-09 | CP-05 | High | SKU-restricted coupon not enforced — ⚪ not a defect for now | | FC-10 | CP-11 | High | Coupons not region-scoped — ⚪ not a defect for now | | FC-11 | PD-13 | High | Store delete orphans products — ✅ fixed | | FC-12 | DS-02 | High | Tag delete fails (FK) — ✅ fixed | | FC-13 | SL-04 | High | Frozen slot accepted — ✅ fixed | | FC-14 | CT-07 | High | Cart ignores out-of-stock — ⚪ not a defect (false flag) | | FC-15 | AU-07 | High | Profile update broken — ✅ fixed | | FC-16 | AU-08 | High | Password change ineffective — ✅ fixed | | FC-17 | OR-12 | Medium | No order idempotency — 🟡 client-side guard (server deferred) | | FC-18 | AD-06 | Medium | Incoherent address region/bound | | FC-19 | RG-02 | Medium | Non-atomic region create — ✅ fixed | | FC-20 | AU-03 | Low | Errors return 500 instead of 4xx | Suggested fix order: **FC-01 → FC-02/03/13 (order validation) → FC-07/08 (pricing) → FC-04/09/10 (coupons) → FC-05 (vendor auth) → FC-16/15 (account) → FC-11/12/19 → FC-17/18/20.** (FC-09/FC-10/FC-14 closed as false flags.)