# Full regression defect register — FR-2026-10-18-01 **Source:** [`docs/test reports/full-regression-2026-10-18.md`](./full-regression-2026-10-18.md) **Run:** FR-2026-10-18-01 · 2026-10-18 **Derived:** this file lists the defects/problems recorded in the report. It is not a re-test and does not add new findings. **Status:** all items are open unless the source report explicitly says they were reverted or repaired. The report states that no source code was modified. The report contains **55 numbered defect entries**. Two are duplicates/extensions of earlier entries: - **#29** duplicates the empty-component issue in **#20**. - **#45** is the same stack-trace/500 root cause as **#8**, with a specific read-path example. - **#37** extends the zero-cap validation issue in **#15** with `minOrder: -5`. So the register has **55 report entries / ~52 distinct defects**. Severity is taken from the report where labelled; where the report gives no explicit severity, a conservative severity is assigned from the demonstrated impact. --- ## P0 — release blockers | # | Defect | Cases | Evidence / source | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | **Customer privilege escalation on admin procedures.** A customer JWT reaches `protectedProcedure`-based admin resolvers. A customer can read the staff list and roles, **suspend any user**, and reach `admin.user.sendNotification` (which can broadcast to all users when `userIds` is empty). About 30 admin procedures use `protectedProcedure` instead of `staffProcedure`. | SEC-01, SEC-28, CUSTOMER-05, CUSTOMER-11, PUSH-19 | U1 suspended user 1327 via `admin.user.updateUserSuspension` (200); staff list/roles exposed; notification path reachable. §1, §21 | | 2 | **Suspension is not enforced.** `createContext` assigns `user` before the suspension check and the catch does not clear it. A suspended user keeps full API access, can log in again, and can read their account; only order placement is blocked. | CUSTOMER-03, CUSTOMER-04 | Suspended U0 old token → `getSelfData` 200; fresh login succeeded; `placeOrder` 403. §1, §20 | | 3 | **JWT signing secret is committed in repository configs.** `wrangler.dev.toml` / `wrangler.prod.toml` contain a weak secret. An offline-minted staff token was accepted as a real staff member. | SEC-06 | Token minted with `my_meatfarmer_jwt_secret_key` accepted; `admin.me` → e2eadminA. §1 | | 4 | **No quantity or inventory bound on order placement.** `quantity: 1e9` created an order worth ₹235,000,000,000. | CART-16, ORDER-04 | Order 2563 created, total ₹235,000,000,000; cancelled as cleanup. §8, §15 | | 5 | **Coupon type switch keeps the old discount.** Editing a percentage coupon to a flat amount returns 200 but leaves both fields; pricing continues to apply the percentage. Applies to regional and global update paths. | CPM-21 | 15% coupon updated with `flatDiscount: 30` still stored `discountPercent: 15`; order discount remained 15%. §13 | | 6 | **Cross-user complaint creation.** U2 can raise a complaint against U1's order; there is no ownership check on the referenced order. | SUPPORT-05 (earlier `COMPLAINT-02`) | Complaint 107 created by U2 against U1's order 2562. §30, §31.4 | | 7 | **Negative / non-finite money accepted.** Negative and `1e308` prices, negative/150% coupons, and negative delivery charges were accepted and served. | STOCK-12, CFG-08, CPM-06 | Negative prices accepted; `deliveryCharge: -50` served; 150% coupon accepted. §5, §13, §29.5 | | 8 | **Business rejections surface as HTTP 500 with stack traces.** Not-found, cross-user, invalid-coupon and other business rejections return 500/`INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR` instead of actionable 4xx; responses expose internal file paths. | SEC-15, SEC-22, UX-03 | `data.stack` with `.wrangler/tmp/.../worker.js` paths in responses. §1, §46 | | 9 | **Unknown or foreign keys accepted.** Global constants accept arbitrary keys; `tagsOrder` accepts garbage/foreign SKU ids; scope checks are otherwise correct. | CFG-13, CFG-17, SEC-13 | `__e2e_unknown_key__` persisted; `tagsOrder='999999,0,-1,999999'` stored. §1, §5 | | 10 | **Regional product suspension cannot be set.** `isSuspendedInRegion: true` returns 200 but does not persist; a "regionally suspended" item remains orderable. | STOCK-07, STOCK-08, CART-08 | Read-back stayed `false`; suspended item ordered successfully. §29.5, §29.9 | | 16 | **Cross-region data leakage and association in admin APIs.** Staff B can read a region-1 customer's details; region-1 objects accept region-2 SKUs/products in slots, tags, groups, stores and product updates. A foreign SKU was attached to a region-1 product. | CUSTOMER-08, SLOT-12, TAG-06, GROUP-05, STORE-07, PROD-11 | Staff B read region-1 customer 388; slot accepted region-2 SKU; product 160 SKUs became `[162,184]`. §31.5–§31.6 | | 41 | **Regional admin can create a `super_admin`-role staff account.** The account is region-scoped, but the role itself is not restricted; its token reaches `admin.user.getAllUsers`. | STAFF-07b | Created role `super_admin` with 200; token got 200 on customer-data admin read; 401 on superadmin routes. §45 | | 52 | **Unauthenticated packaging mutation (IDOR).** `admin.vendorSnippets.updateOrderItemPackaging` is a `publicProcedure` with its staff check commented out. It accepts a sequential `orderItemId`, so anyone can flip packaging state. | VENDOR-07 | No `Authorization` header → 200; `is_packaged` changed; restored to false. §50 | | 53 | **No logout or token revocation; sessions last months.** No logout procedure or revocation store exists. Staff/user JWTs carry multi-month `exp`; a captured token remains valid after logout or password/account changes. | SAUTH-11, SAUTH-03 | All logout paths 404; staff exp ≈ 2026-11-17, user ≈ 2027-01-14; old token still 200. §51 | --- ## P1 — high-priority defects | # | Defect | Cases | Evidence / source | |---|---|---|---| | 11 | **No per-item flash validation.** A non-flash-available SKU is accepted into a flash order. | FLASH-03 (earlier labelled FLASH-04) | Flash order with an ineligible SKU returned 200. §29.10, §31.10 | | 12 | **Double-tolerated terminal mutations.** Resolving an already-resolved complaint and customer-cancelling an already-cancelled order overwrite the stored response/reason. | SUPPORT-10, CANCEL-04 | Complaint response overwritten; second cancel returned 200 and replaced reason. §2, §16, §31.4 | | 13 | **Ghost-user suspension.** `admin.user.updateUserSuspension` accepts a non-existent user id and reports success, creating a ghost row. | CUSTOMER-06 (earlier CUSTOPS-09) | Non-existent id → 200 "User suspended successfully". §29.11 | | 14 | **Soft-deleted SKU remains price-editable.** A price update on a soft-deleted SKU is accepted. | STOCK-15 | Obsolete target returned 200. §29.5 | | 15 | **Minor money/eligibility contract gaps.** `getEligible` ignores an invalid `regionId`; `maxValue: 0` is ignored; negative prices accepted. | CPA-25, MONEY-20, STOCK-12 | Invalid region returned full list; zero cap still discounted; negative/1e308 accepted. §29.8, §29.9, §44 | | 17 | **`getUserDetails` returns 500 for a user with a large order history.** Other users return 200. | CUSTOMER-01 | "Failed query: select id from orders …". §31.5 | | 18 | **No coordinate or delivery-sequence validation.** `lat:200, lng:400` accepted; delivery sequences accept duplicate, unknown and foreign order ids. | DELIVERY-08, DELIVERY-04, DELIVERY-05 | Out-of-range coordinates 200; sequence `[2637,999999,2638,2637]` 200. §31.3 | | 19 | **`javascript:` banner destination accepted.** Redirect scheme is not validated. | BANNER-11 | `javascript:alert(1)` accepted. §31.6 | | 20 | **Combo integrity gaps.** Self-referencing and empty-component combos are accepted. | COMBO-07, COMBO-08 | Both returned 200. §31.6 | | 21 | **Group deletion ignores active slot attachment.** A group attached to an active slot can be deleted. | GROUP-10 | Delete returned 200. §31.6 | | 22 | **Store accepts an invalid/unclaimed image key.** | STORE-10 | Store create with bad key returned 200. §31.6 | | 23 | **Delivered orders remain editable by the customer; notes have no length limit.** | EDIT-03, EDIT-04 | Delivered order note update 200; 411-char unicode note accepted. §31.2 | | 24 | **Fulfilment blocked by a soft-deleted product.** A valid order cannot be delivered once the product row is soft-deleted. | FUL-14 | Deliver returned 400. §31.1 | | 25 | **Flash-order integrity.** A scheduled slot id is accepted in a flash payload; coupons on flash orders are rejected. | FLASH-08, FLASH-15 | Flash + scheduled slot 200; flash + coupon 400. §31.10 | | 27 | **Structural product/tag changes are not published.** Product create and tag create did not advance `products_version_num`; the new SKU was absent from the published products file after 30s/8s. | CACHE-02, CACHE-13 | Version stayed 20→20 and 22→22; new SKU missing. §33.3 | | 28 | **Slot accepts `freezeTime` after `deliveryTime`.** | SLOT-09 | Invalid slot accepted 200. §33.3 | | 30 | **Upload validation gaps.** External `https://` image URLs and unsupported MIME types are accepted; 6 MB/corrupt bodies can be PUT under an image MIME. | UPLOAD-09, UPLOAD-10, UPLOAD-20 | External URL accepted; `application/x-msdownload` signed; 6 MB/corrupt PUT 200. §33.3 | | 32 | **Duplicate global product on concurrent create.** Two simultaneous same-name creates both returned 200. | GP-18 | Two global product rows. §37 | | 33 | **Tag update accepts an invalid image key.** Same class as #22 but a different endpoint. | TAG-11 | Update returned 200. §37 | | 35 | **Coupon dropdown hides ineligible coupons instead of showing disabled reasons.** The API returns 33 coupons including all disabled classes; the sheet shows only 8 applicable rows and no disabled rows. | CLS-02, CLS-03, CLS-04, CLS-05, CLS-06 (CLS-15 related) | API vs UI comparison; no "Disabled + reason" layout. §41, §51 | | 37 | **Zero coupon cap is ignored; negative `minOrder` accepted.** Extends #15. | MONEY-20 | `maxValue:0` still discounted; `minOrder:-5` accepted. §44 | | 38 | **Address creation has no idempotency.** An ambiguous retry creates duplicate address rows. | ADDR-21 | Two rows after retry. §44 | | 40 | **Duplicate staff identity via concurrency.** Simultaneous same-username creates both succeed. | STAFF-11 | Two rows returned 200. §45 | | 42 | **Account deletion returns 500 for users with orders.** No deletion/anonymisation path for users with history; the row and token survive. | PROFILE-11 | FK delete failure; post-delete `/self` still 200. §45 | | 43 | **Duplicate store on retry.** Same store name created twice. | STORE-12 | 200/200; two rows. §45 | | 44 | **`getOrderById` returns 500 where 4xx is required.** Non-existent, malformed and another user's order ids all return 500. | ORDER-10, UX-03 | `parseInt` feeds `NaN` into the query; 500 `-32603`. §46 | | 45 | **Error responses carry full stack traces.** Same root cause as #8; specific read-path example. | UX-03, SEC-22 | Stack with absolute `.wrangler/tmp` paths. §46 | | 46 | **No idempotency on order placement.** An identical retry creates a second order and double-charges. | CHECK-09, CHECK-11, ORDER-16, UX-04, UX-14 | Orders 2709/2710 from identical submits. §46 | | 47 | **Cart is silently destroyed by an unconfirmed startup region switch.** When the persisted browsing region differs from the address/GPS-anchored region at launch, startup calls `confirmRegionSwitch` without a dialog; that function clears both carts despite requiring user confirmation. The earlier "first adoption" explanation was corrected in §54. | UX-01, UX-05, LOC-09, LOC-19 | Cold start with carts; region mismatch path clears carts with no warning; address-selector path does show a confirmation. §47, §54 | | 49 | **Cart values are never validated; native cart cannot survive corrupt JSON.** Negative/non-numeric/1e9 quantities keep checkout enabled; native `getLocalCart` has no try/catch. | CART-13, CART-21 | Web bill ₹233,000,000,000 for `1e9`; native corrupt read throws. §48 | | 50 | **Closed delivery slot is silently rewritten; web has no closed-slot guard.** Native rewrites the line to the earliest valid slot without notice; web keeps checkout enabled. | CGRD-03, CART-20 | Line moved from 30 Oct to 5 Nov; web "Proceed to Checkout" stayed enabled. §49 | | 51 | **`admin.slots.updateSlot` is a destructive partial update.** Omitted `groupIds` clears associations; invalid group ids are silently dropped. | SLOT-16 | Slot 2085 `[17] → []`; `[5,999999] → [5]` with 200. §50 | --- ## P2 — lower-priority defects and gaps | # | Defect | Cases | Evidence / source | |---|---|---|---| | 26 | **Unbounded text.** Complaint body (5,000 chars) and order notes (411 chars) have no length limits. | SUPPORT-04, EDIT-04 | Accepted without limit. §31.2, §31.4 | | 29 | **Empty-component combo accepted.** Duplicate of #20. | COMBO-08 | 200. §33.3 | | 31 | **No string-length limits on names.** Store/product names (and previously address/name fields) accept Unicode + 300+ chars. | STORE-05, PROD-09; ADDR-09, AUTH-09, SUPPORT-04, EDIT-04 | 300-char names accepted. §29, §33.3 | | 34 | **Non-default address deletion fails in the app UI.** The API deletes it, but the confirmed UI action leaves the row listed. | ADDR-14 | Confirmed delete; address remained. §37.1 | | 36 | **Mismatched DELIVER-TO label after GPS region adoption.** The region pill shows region 2 while the address line still shows the region-1 address. | LOC-19(b), REGION/LOC header | Screenshot `u18_region2gps`. §42.2 | | 39 | **New region's bound not visible immediately.** `superadmin.regions.bounds` returns 0 bounds right after create while `effectiveSettings` works. | REGION-16 | Immediate read returned 0 bounds. §44 | | 48 | **Floating "1 Hr Delivery" CTA intercepts taps.** It covers the bottom row of scrollable lists; the Terms row could not be tapped. | UX-10, UX-16 | Tap on Terms row opened the quick-delivery dialog. §47 | | 54 | **Empty cart is not validated for flash orders.** `selectedItems: []` reaches Drizzle and returns 500 with an internal message. | FLASH-13 | "values() must be called with at least one value". §52 | | 55 | **Flash (slot-less) orders cannot reach vendor production/packing views.** Vendor demand is keyed by `slotId`; flash orders have `slotId: null`. | FLASH-15 / vendor demand | `getSlotOrders` showed 0 flash orders; `getAll` does show them. Flagged for product confirmation. §52 | --- ## Non-defect observations and scope blockers These are recorded by the report but are not counted as product defects above: | Item | Status | Note | |---|---|---| | Notifications / push | **SKIPPED (19)** | Excluded by owner instruction; real delivery not exercised. The reachable `admin.user.sendNotification` path is covered as a privilege defect (#1). | | OTP authentication | **SKIPPED (15)** | Excluded from the password regression; no real SMS/OTP. | | Queue/scheduler jobs | **SKIPPED (12)** | `JOB-03…10`, `JOB-12…15` excluded; no `--test-scheduled` harness used. | | Fallback/legacy UI | **SKIPPED (14)** | `apps/fallback-ui` excluded and not running. | | Admin web | **BLOCKED** | Not running; `SAUTH-15` and admin-web parity cases not driven. | | `create-user` script (`USR-01…06`) | **BLOCKED** | `bcryptjs` not installed for the available Bun/tsx runners. | | Rate-limit harness (`SEC-24`) | **BLOCKED** | No approved bounded harness. | | Policy cases | **BLOCKED** | `ORDER-22` N/A (accepted historical zero discount), `EDIT-14` policy, `BOUND-09` cross-region overlap. | | Expo Go permission prompt | **Not a product defect** | Per-experience Expo Go prompt; documented as a harness artifact. | | Web cart fee presentation | **Not a defect** | Web defers the delivery fee to checkout while native shows it in the cart; recorded as a platform difference. | | UI assertion failures | **Inconclusive** | Some Maestro chains failed due to leftover modals/full-string matching; report marks these as inconclusive, not product failures. | --- ## Report hygiene / inconsistencies - The report's defect count changes through the document: **34** at §38, **48** at §47, **52** at §50, **55** at §54. This register uses the final **55 entries**. - The execution tally is also inconsistent across phases (e.g. §36 says ~510 executed/~275 not run; §47 says ~668/~127; §54 says ~707/~88; §50 says ~683/~112). Treat coverage percentages as approximate. - §30 corrects many provisional case IDs (for example `COMPLAINT-*` → `SUPPORT-*`, `CUSTOPS-*` → `CUSTOMER-*`, `DELIV` → `DELIVERY-*`). This register uses the corrected IDs. - #29 duplicates #20; #45 duplicates the root cause in #8; #37 extends #15. - The report says no source code was modified. These defects are therefore **reported, not fixed**, in that run. --- ## Suggested triage order 1. **#1, #2, #3, #52, #53** — authentication, suspension, secret and unauthenticated-write blockers. 2. **#4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9** — money integrity, cross-user data, error contract, unknown-key validation. 3. **#10, #16, #41** — regional suspension, cross-region leakage, role escalation. 4. **#27, #35, #47, #49, #50** — publication, coupon UI, cart destruction and cart validation. 5. Remaining P1, then P2. No files other than this register were changed.