5 KiB
Authorization, isolation and API contracts
Scope: all public/customer/staff/superadmin procedures, ownership, current staff assignments and mutation failures. These are direct API checks; hidden screens do not prove enforcement.
Identity matrix
For each relevant route, test anonymous, U1, U2, staff A, staff B, superadmin, expired token and deleted/reassigned identity. Public discovery is public; customer private data is owner-scoped; regional operations are staff-region-scoped; global authoring/configuration is superadmin-only. Exact staff-role privileges need a documented policy matrix, not assumed universal access.
| ID | Priority | Action / input | Expected result |
|---|---|---|---|
| SEC-01 | P0 | Anonymous/customer calls every admin/superadmin mutation. | Denied before DB/assets/job writes; no private payload. |
| SEC-02 | P0 | Regional staff calls superadmin region/staff/global CRUD/config. | No escalation, including legacy global-config endpoints. |
| SEC-03 | P0 | Staff B probes A product/store/slot/tag/group/banner/coupon IDs. | Read/write/delete denied; no existence-sensitive private content. |
| SEC-04 | P0 | Authorized A object save with B SKU/store/group/related IDs. | Entire invalid association rejected without hidden partial writes. |
| SEC-05 | P0 | U2 probes U1 address/order/complaint/payment/coupon IDs. | Ownership always enforced, including signed payment callbacks. |
| SEC-06 | P0 | Forged/expired/malformed JWT, altered identity/region/role fields. | Verification fails; no default or fallback privilege. |
| SEC-07 | P0 | Removed staff/deleted user token; staff reassigned A→B. | Current identity/assignment enforced; old region claim not trusted alone. |
| SEC-08 | P0 | Regional edit of global product structural fields/global suspension. | Only authorized market fields writable; globally shared structure protected. |
| SEC-09 | P0 | Public catalog/detail/summary upload/token routes inspected. | Only intended public fields/contexts; no internal notes or credentials. |
| SEC-10 | P0 | Mixed-region checkout and foreign address-bound pairing. | Coherent region/address/SKU/slot/bound validation; no fee manipulation. |
| SEC-11 | P0 | Item packaging with unrelated item ID or vendor authority. | Item association/allowed snippet scope checked server-side. |
| SEC-12 | P0 | Invalid/empty ID, whitespace/numeric-prefix string, huge/nonfinite IDs. | Schema rejects malformed identity; no accidental parseInt target. |
| SEC-13 | P1 | Unknown key, wrong-scope constant key, incorrect type, null vs omission. | Contract explicit; unexpected write fields don't bypass restrictions. |
| SEC-14 | P0 | Customer-supplied money, creator ID, user ID, cancellation actor. | Server-owned fields not trusted; financial/audit identity correct. |
| SEC-15 | P0 | Business rejection OOS/full slot/protected delete/invalid coupon. | Correct actionable 4xx/error contract, no misleading 500 or success. |
| SEC-16 | P0 | Failure at each relation/image/status write boundary. | No partial row or asset deletion; unauthorized scope untouched. |
| SEC-17 | P1 | Duplicate deletes/toggles/cancels, concurrent conflicting requests. | Defined conflict/idempotence; no duplicate financial/history side effects. |
| SEC-18 | P0 | Limited-use coupon and reserved redemption races. | Authoritative one-time/per-user invariants; no overuse/dual claim. |
| SEC-19 | P1 | Large arrays/string payloads and unsupported query/page limits. | Bounded safe validation; no dropped/partial unreported batches. |
| SEC-20 | P0 | Script/HTML in names/notes/links/filenames. | Safe rendering/navigation/storage; no script execution or arbitrary object delete. |
| SEC-21 | P0 | SQL-special strings/filter/order input. | Parameterized/safe handling; no injection or unintended query scope. |
| SEC-22 | P0 | Private response/error/log inspection. | No password hashes, signed secrets, full tokens, other-user PII. |
| SEC-23 | P1 | Untrusted browser origin and supported CORS/auth transport. | Approved origin policy; credential handling secure; no unintended cross-origin mutation. |
| SEC-24 | P1 | Repeated auth/code requests in approved bounded harness. | Approved rate/abuse controls; no real SMS/notification flood. |
| SEC-25 | P0 | Reads/mutations after UI logout or account switch with cached queries. | Private stale data cleared; API still denies unauthorized access. |
| SEC-26 | P1 | Public health/legacy operational/deep-link routes. | Sensitive operations require intended authority, not merely knowledge of URL. |
| SEC-27 | P1 | Authorization failure followed by valid retry. | No poisoned transaction/loading guard; valid request succeeds once. |
Evidence requirements
For each denial, record sanitized status/body plus target and sibling pre/post values. For list authorization, test filters, pagination and direct-ID endpoints, not only the default list. For global entities, distinguish intentionally public/shared structural reads from prohibited writes. Record capacity and order-idempotency deferred policies separately; do not replace specified one-time coupon protections with characterization of an existing race.