freshyo/apps/backend/tests/BUGS.md
2026-10-01 00:33:03 +05:30

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# Known bugs — apps/backend
Found while writing the API integration suites under `tests/api/`. Each entry
gives the source location, the actual behaviour, the expected behaviour and the
test that pins it. Severity is my judgement of impact.
---
## High — security / data integrity
### 1. A user token can perform admin writes (missing staff guard)
`src/trpc/trpc-index.ts` — `protectedProcedure` only requires *some* identity
(`ctx.user` OR `ctx.staffUser`). Many `admin.*` procedures never re-check
`ctx.staffUser`, so a plain user token can call them.
Confirmed reachable with a user token:
- `admin.order.cancelOrder` — cancel any order
- `admin.user.updateUserSuspension` — suspend any user
- `admin.const.updateConstants` — change app configuration
- `admin.user.sendNotification` — broadcast notifications
- `admin.product.toggleOutOfStock` (and the other `admin.product.*` writes)
- `admin.staffUser.createStaffUser` — **create a usable staff account (privilege escalation)**; the new account can log in
Procedures that *do* guard correctly: `admin.slots.*`, `admin.coupon.create`,
`admin.coupon.createReservedCoupon` (they check `ctx.staffUser?.id`).
**Fix:** add a `staffProcedure` (or a `ctx.staffUser` check) to every `admin.*`
write.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/authorization-matrix.test.ts`.
### 2. Public `admin.vendorSnippets` endpoints
`src/trpc/apis/admin-apis/apis/vendor-snippets.ts`
- `getUpcomingSlots:176? / 259` — `publicProcedure`
- `getOrdersBySnippet:176` — `publicProcedure`, returns order/customer data for a snippet code
- `getOrdersBySnippetAndSlot:275` — `publicProcedure`
- `updateOrderItemPackaging:362` — `publicProcedure` with the staff check **commented out** (lines 355-360), so anyone can flip packaging state
**Fix:** require staff on all four.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/authorization-matrix.test.ts`.
### 3. `user.auth.updateProfile` always throws
`src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/auth.ts:342`
```ts
const authHeader = ctx.req.header('authorization');
```
`ctx.req` is a fetch `Request` (see `src/app.ts` context: `{ req, c, ... }`),
which has `.headers.get(...)`, not `.header(...)`. The call throws
`TypeError: ctx.req.header is not a function`.
Worse, the profile update (`updateUserProfileInDb`) and the profile image URL
resolving both run *before* line 342, so the write is committed and the client
still receives an error — a silent partial success.
**Fix:** `ctx.req.headers.get('authorization')` (or use `ctx.c`).
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/misc-procedures.test.ts` — "pins: updateProfile
crashes after writing the change".
### 4. `user.auth.updatePassword` silently does nothing
`packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/user-apis/auth.ts:177` (`upsertUserPassword`)
```ts
try {
await db.insert(userCreds).values({ userId, userPassword: hashedPassword })
return
} catch (error) {
if (error.code === '23505') { /* postgres unique violation -> UPDATE */ }
throw error
}
```
`user_creds` has **no UNIQUE constraint on `user_id`** (schema: `id, user_id,
user_password, created_at`), and `23505` is the *Postgres* unique-violation code
— on D1 the insert simply succeeds. Result: a second credentials row is created,
`getUserAuthCreds` keeps returning the original row, and the account's password
never changes.
Verified: after "updating" the password, the **old password still logs in** and
the new one is rejected; the user now has duplicate rows in `user_creds`.
**Fix:** add a UNIQUE index on `user_creds.user_id` and handle the SQLite
constraint code, or do an explicit select-then-insert/update.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/misc-procedures.test.ts` — "pins: updatePassword
reports success but the old password still works".
---
## High — money
### 5. A ≥100% coupon produces a negative order total
`packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/user-apis/order.ts` (`applyDiscountToOrder`)
The percentage branch caps the discount at `maxValue * proportion` or `Infinity`
and **never at `orderTotal`** (the flat branch does cap at the order total). A
coupon with `discountPercent >= 100` and no `maxValue` therefore drives
`orders.totalAmount` to zero or negative. `admin.coupon.create` accepts any
`discountPercent` (no upper bound).
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/coupon-math.test.ts` — "pins: a 150% coupon produces a
negative total".
### 6. The discount is applied to the delivery-inclusive base
`src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/order.ts:156`
```ts
const orderTotalAmount = isFirstOrder ? subOrderTotalWithDelivery : subOrderTotal;
```
`isFirstOrder` is true for the **first sub-order of every placeOrder call**, so
that sub-order's discount is computed on `goods + deliveryCharge`. A percentage
coupon therefore discounts the delivery fee as well.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/coupon-math.test.ts` — "pins: a percentage coupon
discounts the delivery fee too".
### 7. Money is never rounded
Nothing rounds `totalAmount`; it is written with `.toString()` on a raw float, so
percentage discounts leave float noise (e.g. `999 - 15%`).
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/coupon-math.test.ts` — "pins: amounts are stored
unrounded".
---
## Medium — coupon rules
### 8. Coupon scoping is not enforced at placeOrder
`validateAndGetCoupon` checks invalidated / expiry / per-user limit / minOrder /
first-order-only, but **not** `isUserBased`, `applicableUsers`, `skuIds` or
`exclusiveApply`. Only the display endpoints (`getEligible` / `getMyCoupons`)
filter by applicability, so user B can spend a coupon issued to user A by
passing its id to `placeOrder`.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/coupon-ux.test.ts` — "pins: user B can apply a coupon
issued to user A".
### 9. Cancelling an order does not release its coupon usage
`recordUserCouponUsage` runs at placement; `cancelOrderTransaction` never touches
`coupon_usage`. A cancelled order permanently consumes a `maxLimitForUser` slot.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/order-lifecycle-gaps.test.ts` — "pins: cancelling an
order does not release its coupon usage".
### 10. A cancelled first order poisons an `isFirstOrderOnly` coupon
`getOrderCount` counts every order including cancelled ones, and
`isUserBased`/first-order checks run off it — so placing and cancelling a first
order permanently blocks a first-order-only coupon for that user.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/order-lifecycle-gaps.test.ts` — "pins: a cancelled
first order poisons an isFirstOrderOnly coupon".
### 11. Reserved-coupon expiry is not checked at redemption
`redeemReservedCoupon` checks "already redeemed" and first-order-only, but not
`validTill`. An expired reserved code still redeems (it only fails later at
`placeOrder`).
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/coupon-ux.test.ts` — "pins: an expired reserved code
still redeems".
### 12. `exclusiveApply` is stored but never enforced
Coupons carry `exclusiveApply`, and `placeOrder` accepts a single `couponId`, so
the flag has no effect anywhere. (Observation from reading the code; no runtime
test.)
---
## Medium — placeOrder guards
### 13. Out-of-stock products are still orderable
`placeOrderUtil` checks `isFlashAvailable` for flash orders but never
`isOutOfStock`.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/place-order-edge-cases.test.ts`.
### 14. An empty `selectedItems` list fails with a raw DB error
There is no `.min(1)` on `selectedItems`, so an empty list reaches Drizzle, which
throws `values() must be called with at least one value` instead of returning a
400.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/place-order-edge-cases.test.ts`.
### 15. No quantity cap
`quantity` is `z.number().int().positive()` with no upper bound; `1_000_000`
units are accepted.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/place-order-edge-cases.test.ts`.
### 16. No slot validity checks
`placeOrder` only checks slot *capacity*. An inactive slot, a slot whose delivery
time has already passed, and a slot that does not carry the ordered SKU are all
accepted.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/place-order-edge-cases.test.ts`.
### 17. No idempotency
Two identical `placeOrder` calls create two orders (`orderGroupId` is
`Date.now()-userId`, with no uniqueness check).
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/place-order-edge-cases.test.ts`.
---
## Low — error handling / lifecycle
### 18. `cancelOrder` swallows every error into one generic message
`src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/order.ts:554-599` wraps the whole handler in a
`try/catch` that rethrows `new ApiError("failed to cancel order")`, discarding
the specific 404/400 messages it constructs ("Order not found", "Order is already
cancelled", "Cannot cancel delivered order"). `updateUserNotes`, by contrast, has
no catch and propagates its real messages.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/order-lifecycle-gaps.test.ts` and
`tests/api/authorization-matrix.test.ts`.
### 19. No order status transition guards
`admin.order.updateDelivered` / `updatePackaged` accept any state: a cancelled
order can be marked delivered, and delivered is reversible.
**Pinned by:** `tests/api/order-lifecycle-gaps.test.ts`.
### 20. `getUserDetails` breaks past ~110 orders
`admin.user.getUserDetails` builds an unchunked `IN (...)` over the user's order
ids and fails once the history is large. Documented in
`tests/api/admin-users.test.ts` (that suite uses a throwaway user to avoid it).
---
## Out of scope (per request)
Online payments (`user.payment.*`, `admin.payments.initiateRefund`), OTP
(`sendOtp`/`verifyOtp`) and `deleteAccount` are deliberately untested and not
listed here.