freshyo/REPO-REVIEW-OPUS.md
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Freshyo Monorepo — Full Code Review

  • Date: 2026-11-02
  • Branch: main, at commit 0ca0a95
  • Method: read-only review. No files under review were edited, and no tests or migrations were run.
  • Scope: all apps and packages except packages/db_helper_postgres, which is abandoned.
  • Known issues: anything already listed in unfixed-issues-MULTI_REGION_I2.md is left out.
  • Deployment model: the git remote is private and self-hosted, so repository contents are not treated as an exposure vector. Findings that only matter if the repo leaks (committed credentials, database dumps, tracked .env files) are excluded.

Severity runs from Critical to High, Medium and Low. ✓ means the finding was checked directly in the source. Unmarked findings come from the area reviewers, with the confidence they reported.


Round 1

Critical

C1. The production superadmin is seeded with a test password and cannot be changed

  • Where: packages/db_helper_sqlite/drizzle/0006_regions_and_superadmins.sql:96-98 seeds the superadmin user with a fixed bcrypt hash that matches TEST_SUPERADMIN_PASSWORD in apps/backend/tests/.env. There is no endpoint for changing the superadmin password.
  • Why this still matters with a private repo: the exposure is not "someone reads the repo". It is that the production credential is a test credential:
    • anyone who has ever had a clone, a backup, a laptop, a CI log or a screenshare retains it;
    • it cannot be rotated through the product, only by hand-editing the database;
    • superadmin login (superadmin-apis/apis/auth.ts:10) has no throttling, so a weak or common test password is remotely brute-forceable.
  • Check: confirm what the live production hash actually resolves to. If it is still the seeded value, log in and change it, or add a password-change endpoint.

C2. Admin endpoints can be called with a customer token ✓

  • Cause: adminRouter (admin-apis/apis/admin-trpc-index.ts) has no staff-only gate, and protectedProcedure (trpc-index.ts:121-128) accepts customer tokens.
  • Confirmed reachable by a customer:
    • admin.user.updateUserSuspension (admin-apis/apis/user.ts:143-157) can suspend or unsuspend any user, with no region check either.
    • admin.user.sendNotification (user.ts:183-252) sends any title, text and image to every device when userIds: [].
    • admin.staffUser.getStaff and getRoles (staff-user.ts:66,121) list every staff member, role and permission.
  • Partly protected: admin handlers that read ctx.staffUser!.regionId fail with a TypeError (a 500) when a customer calls them, so they are protected by accident.
  • Fix: add a staffProcedure and use it for the whole admin router.

C3. The dev worker uses the production database ✓

  • Where: wrangler.dev.toml:14 and wrangler.prod.toml:12 have the same D1 database_id, and the same JWT secret.
  • Impact: a deploy:dev build reads and writes live orders, and a dev-issued token is accepted by production (it is the same signing key, so environment separation does not exist at the auth layer).
  • Also affected: dev image uploads go to the meatfarmer-dev bucket while their database rows land in prod, so those images break in prod.
  • Related ✓: apps/backend/reset-remote-db.sh:24-25 runs wrangler d1 delete and then create on that database. Prod goes down, and the new database id no longer matches wrangler.prod.toml.

High

H1. Database transactions do nothing ✓

  • Cause: packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/db/db_index.ts:29-33 replaces transaction with handler(base), so the 36 call sites get no atomicity.
  • Order placement: placeOrderTransaction (user-apis/order.ts:339-368) inserts the orders, then the items five at a time, then the statuses. Cart deletion and recordUserCouponUsage are separate writes.
  • Effect of a partial failure: an order with no items or no order_status row. It can't be cancelled ("Order status not found"), or the discount is applied but the coupon usage is never recorded.
  • Other writers affected: createSlotWithRelations, rebalanceSlots, product create/update, and user and admin cancel.
  • Fix: use db.batch, as redeemReservedCoupon already does.

H2. Coupon limits can be beaten by placing two orders at once

  • Where: validateAndGetCoupons (user-apis/order.ts:150,168) checks usage, and the usage row is only written after the orders are inserted.
  • Gap: no unique constraint, conditional write or idempotency key prevents a second use.
  • Scenario: two parallel placeOrder calls with a maxLimitForUser=1 or first-order-only coupon both get the discount.
  • Related: orderGroupId = \${Date.now()}-${userId}` (order.ts:69`) can collide when one user sends two requests in the same millisecond.

H3. Suspended users keep full tRPC access ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/app.ts:80-94.
  • Cause: user = decoded is set before the suspension check, and the thrown TRPCError is swallowed by catch {}. Suspension is only enforced on the Hono /api/v1 path.

H4. vendorSnippets.updateOrderItemPackaging needs no login ✓

  • Where: admin-apis/apis/vendor-snippets.ts:366-387. It is a publicProcedure, and its auth check is commented out.
  • Impact: anyone can flip is_packaged on any order item by trying sequential IDs.
  • Related: getOrdersBySnippetAndSlot (:278-298) ignores snippet validTill and never checks that the slot belongs to the snippet or its region. One valid code returns another region's customer orders.

H5. An address outside every delivery area takes the region the client sends ✓

  • Where: user-apis/apis/order.ts:80-90.
  • Cause: when the address has coordinates but resolveRegionAndBound returns null, the else if skips address.regionId.
  • Impact: the client's regionId/boundId then decides pricing, the delivery charge, the free-delivery threshold and whether flash is allowed.

H6. A customer can change their mobile number without OTP

  • Where: user-apis/apis/auth.ts:303-333.
  • Scenario: an attacker sets their account's mobile to a victim's unregistered number. When the victim later logs in by OTP, they land in the attacker's account.

H7. The profile image path can read other buckets

  • Where: user-apis/apis/auth.ts:129,173,180,282,335 → s3-client.ts:160-179.
  • Cause: profileImageUrl accepts any string, and new URL collapses ../. A value like ../meatfarmer-dev/<key> returns a signed GET URL for another bucket's object.
  • Confidence: medium. It depends on the R2 key having access to more than one bucket.

H8. The cart picks delivery slots that have already closed (user-ui and server) ✓

  • Where: apps/user-ui/components/cart-page.tsx:806-824 and :450, hooks/useProductSlotIdentifier.ts:21-23, components/floating-cart-bar.tsx:144-152, and the server's getAllSlotsWithProductsForCache (packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/stores/store-helpers.ts:371-376).
  • Cause: all of these filter only deliveryTime > now and ignore freezeTime.
  • Scenario: after a slot's freeze time, the cart still auto-selects it as the earliest slot, then shows "slot has closed" and blocks checkout.

H9. A slot picked in the user-ui cart reverts on any cart refetch

  • Where: cart-page.tsx:788-831.
  • Cause: the effect depends on cartItems and rewrites each slot from the saved item.slotId. The choices made in setSelectedSlots and "Deliver all at…" are never saved.
  • Scenario: change a slot, then tap +/- or let the app regain focus. The slot jumps back.

H10. web-ui: lowering quantity to 0 never removes the item ✓

  • Where: apps/web-ui/src/components/ProductCard.tsx:68, routes/home.product.$id.tsx:77, routes/flash.tsx:433.
  • Cause: these pass the cart line's id (a Date.now() value), but useRemoveFromCart (hooks/cart-query-hooks.ts:128-142) filters by skuId.

H11. web-ui ignores the per-area "flash delivery enabled" setting

  • Where: apps/web-ui/src/components/AddToCartDialog.tsx:34 hardcodes isFlashDeliveryEnabled = true, and /flash has no gate. user-ui blocks the flash section in flash-delivery/_layout.tsx:14.
  • Impact: production crons switch flash off every day, and web users can still check out. Their orders then fail with a 403.

H12. web-ui never repairs expired cart slots and can pick a past slot

  • Where: apps/web-ui/src/hooks/useProductSlotIdentifier.ts:16-21 returns slots[0] unsorted, with no time filter, and there is no useReconcileCartSlots equivalent. PaymentAndOrderComponent.tsx:104 sends the stored slotId as is.
  • Impact: checkout fails with "Selected delivery slot is closed for orders", and /cart gives no way to change the slot.

H13. web-ui checkout sends out-of-stock and non-flash items, so the whole order is rejected

  • Where: components/PaymentAndOrderComponent.tsx:101-111, routes/flash.checkout.tsx:93, routes/home.checkout.tsx:93. user-ui filters these out (PaymentAndOrderComponent.tsx:121-131).
  • Impact: one out-of-stock line blocks checkout on web, and /cart shows no out-of-stock indicator.

H14. Admin product edit puts every out-of-stock variant back in stock ✓

  • Where: admin-ui products/edit.tsx:163-183 and admin-web dashboard.products.edit.tsx leave isOutOfStock out of the variant payload.
  • Cause: the server defaults the missing value to false (admin-apis/apis/product.ts:62) and writes it.
  • Scenario: fix a typo in a product name, and every out-of-stock variant goes back on sale.

H15. Saving a product twice deletes all its images, from storage too

  • Where: products/edit.tsx:202 calls clearImages() after a successful save while the screen stays open. admin-web does the same (dashboard.products.edit.tsx:195).
  • Cause: on the next save, ProductForm.tsx:253-261 marks every existing key as deleted, and the server removes the R2 objects (apis/product.ts:431-436).

H16. Editing a slot that has vendor snippets fails or duplicates them

  • Where: SlotForm.tsx:65-70 reads snippet.name, but the server only returns snippetCode (db_helper_sqlite/.../slots.ts:110-118).
  • Effect: the update fails validation. If the admin types a name, updateSlotWithRelations (slots.ts:382-402) creates a duplicate snippet with a new code.

H17. Admin delivery sequence saves the wrong driver's list

  • Where: admin-ui delivery-sequences/index.tsx:432-437, 485-491, 714, admin-web dashboard.orders.sequence.tsx:438-457.
  • Cause: the "unsaved changes" flag isn't reset when the selected driver changes.
  • Scenario A: reorder driver A's list, switch to driver B, and save. B's unchanged list is saved, A's reorder is lost, and a success message is shown.
  • Scenario B: saving while "All Users" (-2) is selected stores a corrupt "-2" key. After that, the Unassigned view is always empty and the assignment labels are wrong.

Medium

Backend

  • Cancelled orders can be marked delivered. updateOrderDelivered (admin-apis/order.ts:134-155) has no isCancelled check, and it sends a "delivered" notification. updateOrderPackaged(false) resets isDelivered=false, which reopens a delivered order. Neither path rejects archived orders.
  • Complaints can be filed against another user's order. user-apis/apis/complaint.ts:34-48 never checks orderId against the user.
  • Cache versions can collide. region-cache-versions.ts:40-60 reads the version and then writes +1. Concurrent slot, stock or price mutations can get the same version, and the client never refetches. Fix: UPDATE … SET value = value + 1 RETURNING value.
  • Fractional quantities can never be ordered. placeOrder requires quantity: z.number().int() (order.ts:375), while increment_step is a real column.
  • Combo-only SKUs can be bought on their own. order.ts:164-171 doesn't check isComboOnly.
  • Staff roles are never enforced. Any staff member, even a marketer, can call createStaffUser with a super_admin role.
  • OTP and login have no rate limits. OTP inputs are also put into the provider URL without escaping (otp-utils.ts:35,57). User login and register also reveal whether an account exists.
  • Missing indexes. The hot foreign keys have none: orders.user_id, order_items.order_id, order_status.order_id, coupon_usage(user_id, coupon_id), addresses.user_id, notifications.user_id, notif_creds.user_id, product_skus.product_id. D1 bills per row read.
  • Schema and migration drift. Snapshots stop at 0002 while the journal goes to 0006, so the next drizzle-kit generate will produce a wrong migration. schema.ts doesn't declare the idx_*_region indexes, so they would be dropped. Its region_id nullability also doesn't match the database, and reserved_coupons.region_id has no foreign key.
  • Migration 0006 reuses an old filename. Databases that applied the old 0006–0009 files may never run the squashed content. Confidence: low–medium.

user-ui

  • Stale selected address. useAddressStore isn't reset on logout (AuthContext.tsx:50-64) or on address delete. Checkout shows the default address but submits the stale id, and the order fails with "Invalid address".
  • The Add-to-Cart dialog allows quantity 0 (AddToCartDialog.tsx:261-266). The server then rejects the whole order.
  • The flash cart bill includes items that can't be delivered by flash (cart-page.tsx:357-373, 491-510). The coupon and free-delivery thresholds pass in the cart but fail at checkout.
  • A successful order clears the whole local cart, including items that weren't ordered (PaymentAndOrderComponent.tsx:59-62,94).
  • useAuthenticatedRoute can push the login screen several times because its focus callback is an inline function (hooks/useAuthenticatedRoute.ts:16).

web-ui

  • Login shows no errors at all (routes/login.tsx).
  • The address list doesn't refresh. The invalidation calls use the wrong key format, ['user.address.getUserAddresses'], so they do nothing (CheckoutAddressSelector.tsx:35, checkout-hooks.ts:71, checkout.tsx:130).
  • Flash cart, checkout and success screens show the wrong price. They use price instead of flashPrice, and the flash delivery charge is left out.
  • Logout leaves the previous user's data. It doesn't call queryClient.clear() (lib/auth-context.tsx:101-112). The next user sees the previous user's cached data, and RegionGate writes it into the new user's snapshot.
  • The success page shows a locally computed total instead of the server's totalAmount.

admin-ui and admin-web

  • A price-dialog save with no real change fails the whole batch ("No price fields to update"). It also drops an earlier Flash toggle.
  • Coupon edit can't switch discount type or clear optional fields, because undefined means "keep the current value".
  • Every coupon edit cuts validTill down to midnight.
  • Coupon edit doesn't load exclusiveApply or applicableUsers. Picking users then replaces the existing list.
  • admin-web toggles stock for the whole product instead of per variant (dashboard.products.tsx:85-87).
  • The admin-ui orders list may crash. orders/index.tsx:186 uses {score && score > 0 && …}, which renders a bare 0 outside <Text>. Not reproduced on a device.
  • Rebalance has no confirmation and no double-submit guard, and it shows "Rebalance Complete" from onSettled, so it also appears on errors.

Low

  • Unchecked env values. env-exporter.ts:104-106: if MIN_ORDER_VALUE or DELIVERY_CHARGE is missing they become NaN, and the delivery charge is silently never applied.
  • Unused setting. minOrderAmountForCoupon is editable but never enforced.
  • Blind SSRF. Possible through googleMapsUrl (license-util.ts:3).
  • Loose upload URLs. They don't sign Content-Type, customers can write to admin asset folders, and keys collide when several MIME types are requested at once.
  • Large build artifacts tracked. apps/admin-ui/mfa_20_mar_dev.apk (92 MB), apps/user-ui/user-ui-shafi-dev-arm.apk (35 MB), a 17 MB binary in .opencode/, .expo caches and web-ui/.output. Not a secret risk, but every clone and CI checkout pays for it.
  • Stale Docker setup. It targets the old Postgres/Node backend, so it no longer describes how the app actually runs.
  • ProductCard re-renders every 5 s. user-ui ProductCard.tsx:62-67 bumps an unused updater state.
  • Delivery notes carry over. useCheckoutStore.userNotes survives a successful order and logout.
  • Malformed checkout links crash. A slots deep link without : crashes the checkout screen (checkout-page.tsx:83-90).
  • Cancelling "Remove item" resets the displayed quantity to 1 instead of the stored quantity.
  • Cart writes have no locking. Read-modify-write on AsyncStorage can lose updates.
  • web quantity buttons ignore min/max. The web Quantifier doesn't enforce them for steps that don't divide evenly, and fractional steps build up float error.
  • superadmin-ui and fallback-ui don't check token expiry. The superadmin profile is also not restored after a reload.
  • Suspending a user fails silently in the admin UI.
  • Two admin delivery-sequence problems. The order menu shows stale status after an update, and selected order ids carry over when switching slots.
  • Large reads. Slot and cache reads load the whole productSkus table, and the !item.isDeleted filter is a no-op because the column isn't selected.
  • web flash memoisation doesn't hold. web flash.tsx's handleAddToCart depends on the useMutation result object, which is new on every render, so the memo is ineffective.
  • Home ordering goes stale. user-ui getQuickestSlot is memoised but depends on time, so the home catalogue ordering goes stale as slots expire.

Checked and fine

  • Address queries filter by userId, so there is no address IDOR.
  • /api/test routes are gated by ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES.
  • JWTs use HS256 and carry an expiry.
  • The raw sql usage that was checked is parameterised.
  • Prices are computed on the server, and discounts are capped at the subtotal.
  • Scheduled orders enforce freeze time on the server.
  • Catalogue image cache-busting only touches public asset URLs.
  • web-ui has no dangerouslySetInnerHTML.

Round 2 — deeper review

Round 2 was done by reading the code directly, since the scheduled reviewers were unavailable. Items marked ✓ were read and confirmed in the source.

High

R2-1. The test suite asserts the auth holes as "current" behaviour ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/tests/api/auth-matrix.test.ts.
  • What it does:
    • AUTH-03 asserts that a customer token succeeds on admin.vendorSnippets.getAll and admin.staffUser.getStaff, and gets 500s from the other admin reads.
    • AUTH-04 asserts that a customer token passes the admin write guard, then actually suspends a throwaway user with a customer token and asserts isOk === true.
    • HARNESS-13 and AUTH-11 assert that a suspended user still passes tRPC.
  • Why it matters: these tests pass today, so a green suite does not mean the authorization is correct. Fixing C2 and H3 requires rewriting these cases; until then the suite actively protects the vulnerability.

R2-2. web-ui and admin-web have no tests at all ✓

  • Counts: user-ui 56 test files, admin-ui 65, backend 72, web-ui 0, admin-web 0.
  • Impact: every web-only bug found in round 1 (cart removal, flash gate, address invalidation keys, logout cache, wrong flash prices) is uncovered. The project rule that admin-ui and user-ui changes must be mirrored on web makes this the highest-risk blind spot, because the web copies drift without any test to catch it.

Medium

R2-3. Cancelling an order always returns a 500 with a generic message ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/order.ts:633-690.
  • Cause: the handler catches every error and rethrows new ApiError("failed to cancel order"). ApiError defaults to status 500.
  • Effect: "Order not found" (404), "already cancelled" (400) and "Cannot cancel delivered order" (400) all reach the client as a 500 "failed to cancel order". The specific messages only reach the logs.
  • Second effect: publishCancellation is awaited after the cancel transaction. If the queue publish fails, the user is told the cancellation failed even though it succeeded. Retrying then hits "already cancelled", which also surfaces as the same generic 500.
  • Fix: rethrow ApiError unchanged, and only wrap unknown errors.

R2-4. A coupon can increase the amount the customer pays ✓

  • Where: packages/shared/cart-pricing.ts:493-494.
  • Cause: finalTotal = goodsSubtotal - discountTotal, then deliveryTotal = finalTotal < threshold ? charge : 0. The free-delivery threshold is tested after discounts.
  • Example: goods ₹500, threshold ₹500, delivery charge ₹60, coupon ₹50. Without the coupon the total is ₹500 (free delivery). With it, ₹450 is below the threshold, so the total becomes ₹510. Applying the coupon costs ₹10 more.
  • Note: the user-ui cart (cart-page.tsx:620-638) and the server agree, because both apply the same rule, so the bill is consistent but wrong from the customer's point of view.
  • Fix: compare the threshold against the pre-discount goods subtotal, or never charge more than the no-coupon total.

R2-5. Queue consumers are not idempotent and have no per-message handling ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/lib/queue-consumer.ts.
  • Cause: handleNotifQueue, handleOrderPlacedQueue and handleOrderCancelledQueue loop over batch.messages, await each, and never call ack() or retry().
  • Effect: any throw inside the loop fails the whole batch, so Cloudflare retries all messages, including the ones already processed. That means duplicate pushes and repeated order-placed side effects. A single poison message retries the entire batch until the retry limit.
  • Fix: catch per message, message.ack() on success and message.retry() on failure, or make the handlers idempotent (for example, keyed on order id).

R2-6. runBatched promises a rollback that cannot happen ✓

  • Where: packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/lib/run-batched.ts.
  • Cause: its doc comment says "All chunks commit together, or the whole thing rolls back", but it runs inside db.transaction, which is the no-op from H1.
  • Effect: callers relying on the documented atomicity (archive and order-item chunking) get partial writes on failure.

R2-7. Checkout delivery notes leak between orders and between users ✓

  • Where: apps/user-ui/src/store/checkoutStore.ts, used at cart-page.tsx:287 and PaymentAndOrderComponent.tsx:56.
  • Cause: userNotes is never reset after a successful order or on logout (AuthContext.clearSession clears the token and the query cache only).
  • Effect on a shared device: the next user's first order is pre-filled with the previous user's delivery instructions, and is submitted with them unless the field is edited. On the same account, every order carries the previous order's note.

R2-8. Cart quantity 0 is displayed as the stored quantity ✓

  • Where: apps/user-ui/components/cart-page.tsx:488-499, 357-372.
  • Cause: quantities[item.id] || item.quantity treats a pending 0 as "not set".
  • Effect: when a decrement to 0 is pending or was cancelled, the cart bill and coupon maths use the stored quantity while the row shows 0. This compounds the round-1 Low item "Cancelling 'Remove item' resets the displayed quantity to 1 instead of the stored quantity".

Low

R2-9. Production CORS allows local and LAN origins with credentials ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/app.ts:17-22.
  • What's allowed: http://localhost:5174/4174/4175/4176 and http://192.168.100.126:4175, with credentials: true, in the production worker.
  • Impact: a process listening on the victim's machine at one of those ports can read authenticated cross-origin responses using the web session cookie. Unlikely, but it should be gated on NODE_ENV.

R2-10. user.savePushToken is a public procedure ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/trpc/apis/user-apis/apis/user.ts:73.
  • Intent: deliberately public so that signed-out devices can register a token, and the region comes from the address.
  • Risk: an anonymous caller can register or reassign arbitrary Expo tokens and region ids. Worth rate-limiting, or requiring a signed-out device id.

R2-11. The flash cron comment is wrong (the logic is not) ✓

  • Where: apps/backend/src/lib/flash-delivery-cron.ts:8-9.
  • Details: 0 16 * * * is 21:30 IST, which matches its "9:30 PM IST" comment. 0 1 * * * is 06:30 IST, but the comment says "6:30 PM IST". That is a sign error in a comment only: flash turns on at 06:30 and off at 21:30.
  • Also: the toggle calls computeConstants() and refreshGenKv(), so clients do receive the new bound setting.

R2-12. Customer-reachable admin reads confirmed ✓

  • admin.vendorSnippets.getAll and admin.staffUser.getStaff fully succeed for a customer token, since they never touch ctx.staffUser. The other admin reads fail with a 500 (TypeError) rather than a 401, as documented in AUTH-03.
  • Fix: route all of them through staffProcedure.

Verified as correct (so these are not re-reported later)

  • Region scoping is sound. A script check over every exported helper in packages/db_helper_sqlite/src/{admin,user,superadmin}-apis, stores and lib found that every function that accepts regionId uses it in its query.
  • User ownership is sound. Every helper that accepts userId uses it. Address, order and complaint reads are properly scoped (the complaint write gap is listed separately).
  • Order money maths is server-authoritative. Prices come from the database. The free-delivery threshold, coupon stacking, sub-order splitting and the single delivery charge on the primary sub-order all behave consistently, and the shared helper uses the same ordering on client and server.
  • Slot rules are enforced on the server. Existence, region, active flag, freeze time, delivery time and SKU membership are all checked in placeOrder for scheduled orders. Flash is re-checked against the bound setting.
  • Cron wiring covers all three schedules. Archive at 30 20, flash off at 0 16, flash on at 0 1.
  • API tests target localhost:8787 by default, so they do not point at production.

Suggested order of work

  1. Containment (do first, regardless of code fixes)
    • Verify and change the production superadmin password, and add a way to rotate it.
    • Stop tracking the build artifacts (APKs, .wrangler state, .expo, web-ui/.output); they are repo bloat rather than a secret risk.
    • Give dev its own D1 database, and fix or delete reset-remote-db.sh.
  2. Authorization
    • Add a staffProcedure gate to the whole admin router (C2).
    • Fix the suspension check in app.ts (H3).
    • Make updateOrderItemPackaging authenticated (H4).
    • Then rewrite AUTH-03/04, HARNESS-13 and AUTH-11 so they assert the fixed behaviour (R2-1).
  3. Data integrity
    • Replace db.transaction with db.batch where atomicity is claimed (H1, R2-6).
    • Add an atomic guard for coupon usage (H2).
  4. Slot correctness
    • Filter on freezeTime in the cart, useProductSlotIdentifier, floating-cart-bar and getAllSlotsWithProductsForCache (H8).
    • Persist the user's slot choice in the cart (H9, H12).
  5. Admin data-loss bugs
    • Out-of-stock flags and images on product edit (H14, H15).
    • Slot snippet editing (H16).
    • Delivery sequence save-after-switch (H17).
  6. web-ui parity
    • Cart removal (H10).
    • Flash gate (H11).
    • Checkout filtering (H13).
    • Logout cache and address invalidation.
    • Add the missing web test coverage (R2-2).

Coverage notes

  • Every app and package was read in round 1: backend (auth, business logic, jobs), user-ui, web-ui, admin-ui, admin-web, superadmin-ui, fallback-ui, shared, ui, web-components, schema and migrations, and infra.
  • Round 2 added a full authorization sweep, the order/coupon/slot code paths, jobs and queues, and the cart pricing helper.
  • Less deeply reviewed: superadmin-ui beyond the auth-context issue, fallback-ui, packages/migrator, and the individual packages/ui components. These had a first-pass read only, so treat their sections as non-exhaustive.
  • The abandoned packages/db_helper_postgres was excluded by project rule.